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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. A governmental entity and its contractor owe a duty to protect one 
motorist from the negligent or reckless acts of another motorist? R. 516-26. 
2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to Ball, Ball & 
Brosamer because there was no evidence that the plans and specifications were so 
obviously dangerous that no reasonable contractor would follow them? R. 526-
32. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the standard 
of review of a summary judgment as follows: 
Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review 
conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments 
do not resolve factual issues, this court reviews those conclusions for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling statutory provisions with respect to the claims 
brought by the Trujillos against Ball, Ball & Brosamer. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on 
September 24, 1995, as the Trujillos were traveling eastbound on Interstate 84 in 
Weber Canyon. Scott Griffin was traveling westbound on the same roadway 
when he lost control of his vehicle, crossed the center line, and collided with the 
Trujillos and a barrier installed to guard traffic from the work area. Subsequent 
investigation by the Utah Highway Patrol revealed that Mr. Griffin was driving 
under the influence of alcohol and that his blood alcohol level was .27, or over 
three times the legal limit in Utah. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On October 15, 1996, the Trujillos filed suit against the Utah Department 
of Transportation ("UDOT") and Ball, Ball & Brosamer contending that these 
2 
entities had a duty to protect them from the negligent, intoxicated and reckless 
driving of Mr. Griffin. R. 1. Specifically, they alleged that these parties should 
have installed a portable concrete barrier between the lanes of traffic which 
allegedly would have prevented Mr. Griffin from entering their lane of traffic. 
R.4. 
On November 12, 1997, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson granted 
summary judgment in favor of both UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer. The basis 
for summary judgment for UDOT was that "the decision made in planning and 
designing the 1-84 resurfacing project, which included a Traffic Control Plan 
utilizing barrels to separate the two-way, two-lane operation ('TLTWO') was a 
discretionary act which created immunity for UDOT under the discretionary 
function exception to the Governmental Immunity Act, pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63-30-10(1)." R. 1034. 
The basis for granting summary judgment in favor of Ball, Ball & 
Brosamer was that "in carrying out the plans and specifications for 1-84 as 
drafted by UDOT, it, as the contractor, acted in accordance with the plans and 
3 
specifications which were not so unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable 
contractor would not perform or carry out said plans and specifications." R. 
1034. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action arises out of an automobile accident which occurred on 
September 24, 1995, on 1-84 near Morgan, Utah. 
2. During 1995 and 1996, the Utah Department of Transportation 
contracted with Ball, Ball & Brosamer to reconstruct a twelve mile portion of I-
84. 
3. Although 1-84 typically has two lanes of traffic in each direction, 
separated by a grassy median, to facilitate the construction, the plans and 
specifications called for both lanes of traffic to be diverted onto one side. In other 
words, during 1995, the two lanes typically used for west-bound traffic were 
divided to accommodate both east and west-bound traffic, thereby permitting the 
normal east-bound lanes to be re-constructed. This configuration is characterized 
as Two-Lane, Two-Way Operations (TLTWO). 
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4. The plans and specifications provided for separating the two lanes with 
orange barrels at 100 foot intervals. Another option, which is the subject of this 
litigation, was to use concrete barriers to divide the lanes of traffic. 
5. As noted by the Trujillos, Utah has adopted the Manual of Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). The MUTCD states as follows with respect 
to the use of two-way, two-lane operations through a construction zone: 
When traffic control must be maintained on one roadway of a 
normally divided highway, opposing traffic shall be separated either 
with portable barriers (concrete safety-shape or approved alternate), 
or with channelizing devices throughout the length of the two-way 
operation. The use of striping, raised pavement markers, and 
complementary signing, either alone or in combination is not 
considered acceptable for separation purposes. 
(R. 442)(emphasis added). 
6. The Trujillos' own expert witness, Mr. Thomas Alcorn, testified that the 
MUTCD does not require the use of barrier in two-way, two-lane operations, but 
rather requires an engineering judgment regarding the appropriate means of 
separating traffic: 
Q. That doesn't mandate that barriers are used in order to 
comply with the MUTCD, does it? 
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A. This does not mandate it, no. 
Q. In other words, it's left up to the discretion of the 
designer and the other officials who are actually 
designing the project? 
A. Taking into consideration the other requirements in the 
manual, traffic study be performed and that they take 
into consideration speed, volume, duration, or length of 
project, exposure to hazards and existing rates or 
features of the site. So if they take all that into 
consideration with the language, then they are working 
with the manual. 
R. 2288. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 103, attached as Exhibit "1"). 
7. In fact, Mr. Alcorn testified that, in his professional opinion, the use of 
barrels was appropriate through much of the project, but that barriers should have 
been installed between mileposts 107 and 109 because of a high accident rate 
prior to inception of the project: 
Q. Number three, UDOT failed to provide positive barrier 
through sections with overrespresented accident rates to 
prevent head-on collisions. Have you already stated you 
opinion with respect to that? 
A. Yes, I just want to make clear that I'm not saying that 
you need barrier from one end of this project to the 
other, that there are sections that should have been 
looked at with high accident rates that need barrier. 
Q. Any sections besides 107 through 109? 
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A. Not from the data that I have. One section, there was-
you have two other horizontal curves that have a 
problem, but I didn't convert those to mileposts, so I 
can't tell you exactly where they are at. 
R. 2282. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 97, attached as Exhibit "l").1 
8. Bruce Swenson, the Region One Design Engineer for UDOT, testified 
that he and the design engineer, Jim Thompson, considered the use of barrels and 
barriers and ruled out the use of concrete barriers for several reasons: 
Q. Why did Jim want to use barrels instead of barriers? 
A. Probably several reasons. 
Q. Can you tell me? 
A. Cost would be one. Barrier is a dangerous object in and of 
itself. It has a tendency to roll small vehicles particularly. 
Jim was just as astute as anyone about watching out for the 
little guy, you might say. Because the little haunch that comes 
up on those barriers, they're called a Jersey barrier, and a 
small vehicle gets up on them and, poof, it's right over on its 
top. 
'In their Statement of Fact No. 10, the Trujillos contend that "traffic engineering 
standards, including the MUTCD, required that concrete barriers be installed to separate traffic 
between mileposts 107 and 109." The referenced portions of the record relate to testimony by 
Mr. Alcorn where he stated that he would have installed barriers between mileposts 107 and 109 
based on his evaluation of the relevant factors. To the extent the Trujillos' Statement of Fact 
suggests that there is a blanket requirement to use barrier at any location, it is inconsistent both 
the plain language of the MUTCD and the testimony of Mr. Alcorn. As set forth in the MUTCD 
quotation and Mr. Alcorn's testimony stated above, the MUTCD does not require that barrier be 
used at any location. 
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* * * 
Q. What other reason? 
A. I remember talking about emergency vehicles. You can't just 
leap a barrier with emergency vehicles. If you do have to 
chase them around, you have to chase them clear up and 
around an interchange. 
R. 1824-26. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 19-21, attached as Exhibit "2"). 
9. Mr. Alcorn also testified that barriers pose a risk of harm to motorists in 
and of themselves: 
Q. (By Mr. Morgan) In your opinion, do concrete barriers 
constitute a hazard in and of themselves? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. They are rigid objets. The criteria for the use of barrier is 
very clear, you only use a barrier when the hazard of hitting 
the barrier is less than the hazard of hitting the object that the 
barrier is protecting. 
R. 2288-89. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, pp. 113-14, attached as Exhibit 
10. Ball, Ball & Brosamer's project superintendent, Shankar Narayanan, 
also testified that placing a barrier between the two lanes may result in increased 
rear-end accidents: 
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Q. Mr. Ferguson had you identify the benefits of concrete 
barriers, and you also talked about one of the risks as~I 
believe is being rear end, multiple rear end accidents, is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you have concrete barriers such as have been 
suggested by Mr. Ferguson, if you had those on the 1-84 
project, would that cut down the availability of escape 
on any side in order to avoid a rear-end accident for 
eastbound traffic if there would have been channeled 
concrete barriers on both sides? 
A. You cut down-possibly cut down the access to the~for 
people trying to maneuver out in front, moving across 
into the other lane. 
Q. So, you cut down any escape routes whatsoever to either 
side? 
A. Eastbound? 
Q. By eastbound? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That creates a risk in and of itself, correct? 
A. That creates a risk, too, yes. 
R. 1767. (Deposition of Shankar Narayanan, p. 103, attached as Exhibit "3"). 
11. Prior to letting the project for bid, the Utah Department of 
Transportation entered into an extensive design and review process. Bruce 
Swenson described the process, which begins with a scoping meeting where 
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UDOT "kind of outlines the types of things we're going to do on the project." R. 
1910. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, p. 105, attached as Exhibit "2"). 
12. The scoping meeting is attended by several engineers for UDOT, 
including safety engineers. R. 1911-12. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 106-
07, attached as Exhibit "2"). 
13. The plans are then drawn and there is a "plan in hand" meeting 
involving the same engineers. R. 1912-13. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 
107-08, attached as Exhibit "2"). 
14. The plan in hand meeting is followed by a "PS&E" meeting during 
which each page of the plans and specifications are reviewed by between five and 
twelve engineers. R. 1913-14. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, pp. 108-09, 
attached as Exhibit "2"). 
15. There is then a final review by each of the engineers on the project. 
R. 1915. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, p. 110, attached as Exhibit "2"). 
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16. During each of these levels of review, the Federal Highway 
Administration participates in the review. R. 2044. (Deposition of David 
Kennison, p. 99). 
17. After Ball, Ball & Brosamer was awarded the contract and work 
commenced, Shanker Narayanan became concerned that the 100 foot spacing of 
the barrels, given the speed of traffic, raised the potential for cross-over 
accidents. On May 25, 1995, Mr. Narayanan wrote a letter to Larry Durrant, 
the project engineer for UDOT, stating: 
This letter is to reiterate our concerns with respect to UDOT's less 
than adequate traffic control design for this project. In particular, we 
feel that the use of drums at 100' spacing to delineate opposing 
traffic in an Interstate highway is hazardous to the traveling public 
resulting in increasing the chances of accidents. 
R. 568. (See Letter dated May 25, 1995, attached as Exhibit "4"). 
18. Mr. Durrant sent a return letter stating that Ball, Ball & Brosamer 
should submit a substitute proposal attempting to correct the alleged dangers. R. 
569. (See Letter dated May 30, 1995, attached as Exhibit "5"). 
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19. Mont Smith, the Safety Risk Manager for Region One, has testified 
that absent "horrendous statistics," UDOT would not have reevaluated its 
decision to use barrels instead of concrete barriers: 
Q. What, if anything, would have caused UDOT to switch from 
barrels to barriers on 1-84? 
* * * 
THE WITNESS: I don't believe it is obviously a concern, the safety 
of the highway condition, the user interpretation. I don't believe 
anything short of horrendous statistics would have got another look 
at that. 
R. 2168-69. (Deposition of Mont Smith, pp. 97-98, attached as Exhibit "6"). 
20. Bruce Swenson has also testified that due to the hazards associated with 
using concrete barriers, he would not have approved the use of concrete barriers 
and that is the reason why barrels were used instead of barriers: 
Q. Had the contractor suggested in this particular project that the 
two-way traffic be separated with concrete barriers as opposed 
to barrels or drums, would UDOT have changed to concrete 
barriers throughout the project? 
A. No. 
R. 1923. (Deposition of Bruce Swenson, p. 118, attached as Exhibit "2"). 
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21. On September 24, 1995, the Trujillos were traveling heading east-
bound on 1-84 and traveling at about 45 to 50 miles per hour. R. 581. (Deposition 
of Alan Trujillo, p. 43, attached as Exhibit "7"). 
22. At the same time, Scott Griffin was driving west-bound on 1-84. It was 
later determined that Mr. Griffin, who died in the accident, had a blood alcohol 
content at the time of the accident of .27, which is three and one-half times the 
legal limit. R. 576. (See Police Report, attached as Exhibit "8"). 
23. It was also later determined that Mr. Griffin was traveling at 58 miles 
per hour at the time of the accident. R. 583. (Deposition of Michael Loveland, 
p. 28, attached as Exhibit "9"). 
24. Shortly before the accident, Mr. Griffin lost control of his vehicle, 
crossed the median, and smashed into the concrete barrier separating the travel 
lanes from the work area. He was killed instantly. The Trujillos were heading 
east-bound on 1-84 when Mr. Griffin smashed into the concrete barrier. They, in 
turn, struck Mr. Griffin's vehicle and were injured. R. 576. 
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25. In this case, the Trujillos retained Thomas Alcorn as an expert witness 
to testify as to problems on the project which led to this accident. Mr. Alcorn set 
forth his opinions on Exhibit 72, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "10": 
1. UDOT did not prepare a traffic control plan for the project 
that took into consideration site/hwy characteristics or that complied 
with national standard. 
Speed 
Volume 
Duration 
Exposure to hazard 
Accident history 
Geometries ~ horiz & vert curvature 
2. UDOT failed to reduce speed in accordance with regulations 
for two lane highways and/or site features. 
3. UDOT failed to provide positive barrier through sections with 
overrepresented accident rates to prevent head on collisions. 
4. UDOT [3Bs] failed to conduct or utilize recommendations and 
project information to make necessary modifications to traffic 
control. 
R. 584. 
26. Mr. Alcorn was unable to determine whether speed contributed to Mr. 
Griffin's loss of control prior to the accident: 
Q. Do you know whether or not that loss of control was due to 
speed or some other factor such as intoxication, fatigue or 
inattentiveness? 
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A. I can't tell you how many factors were in it, no. 
Q. You have no way to really determine what caused the truck 
driver to veer off to the right? 
BY MR. FERGUSON: Truck driver? 
Q. (By Mr. Williams) The pickup driver, Mr. Griffin. 
A. No, I don't. 
R. 2269. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 84, attached as Exhibit "1"). 
27. When Mr. Alcorn originally wrote out his opinions, he did not include 
Ball, Ball & Brosamer in his criticisms. However, after conversing with the 
Trujillos' counsel, he added Ball, Ball & Brosamer only to Opinion No. 4.: 
Q. Calling your attention to Exhibit 72, you were asked to during 
a break write down your opinions that you were going to 
express in this case; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you had about how long to write down those 
opinions during the break? 
A. I believe I took 10 or 15 minutes. 
Q. And having written down those opinions, then you were asked 
questions with regards to them once the deposition 
commenced; is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you first wrote down your opinions on Exhibit 72, 
before you were asked a question, am I correct that on opinion 
number four, the slash and Three Bees was not there when 
you first wrote it down? 
A. You're correct. 
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Q. Once you were asked questions, when you were reading 
number four, your counsel turned over to you and briefly 
conversed with you, and you added Three Bees; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
R. 2293. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 108, attached as Exhibit "1"). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer's duty is limited to providing a 
roadway reasonably safe for travel, and neither UDOT nor Ball, Ball & 
Brosamer have a duty to protect one motorist from the negligent or reckless 
conduct of another motorist. In this case, the Trujillos have not shown that there 
was a defect in the roadway which rendered it unsafe for travel by a motorist 
exercising reasonable care. Although the Trujillos contend that the 65 mile per 
hour speed limit and "under designed" corners may have led to the accident, 
even their own expert witness concluded that he was unable to determine why 
Mr. Griffin lost control of his vehicle. 
Applying the "special relationship" reasoning adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer do not have a duty to protect 
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one motorist from the negligent or reckless acts ,i; , , i , . . 
would be realistically incap;t. v performance 
prevent one tvpr ;-cvMillion won1 •,v - : • • '< ' , 
therebv making r. iiupu> •; •- 3samer to fulfill 
such a duty n ^dictions. 
' idii <k Brosamer were 
unreaso•..= a reasonable amiradui would not follow 
'-rt witness, lhuiiiui .Vicorn, testified that the use 
< v n "-naic uiioagiiuuv much ci Uic construction /one, but that 
rier should have Uccii used through areas v 'th : igh <u Jdent rates. There is 
iio evidence that Bail, Ball & Brosamer knew or should have known of the 
accident rates prior to this accident. There is no frstimmv expert or others „ 
that the plans and specifications were so unreasonably ,„ .,_^  , ) 
reasonable contractor would follow them. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
BALL, BALL & BROSAMER HAD NO DUTY TO 
IMPLEMENT TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES TO PROTECT 
THE TRUJILLOS FROM THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF 
SCOTT GRIFFIN. 
Ball, Ball & Brosamer respectfully contends that it fulfilled any legal duty 
to the Trujillos and cannot be held liable for this unfortunate accident. As set 
forth below, the Trujillos cannot demonstrate that there was a defect in the 
roadway which rendered the road unreasonably safe for travel or a defect which 
was a proximate cause of the accident. Rather, the Trujillos contend that this 
Court should impose a duty upon both UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer to 
install barriers or other traffic control devices to protect them from the negligent 
or reckless driving of Scott Griffin. Ball, Ball & Brosamer contends that 
imposition of such a duty would be impossible to fulfill and should not be 
adopted.2 
2
 This argument was raised before the trial court as part of Ball, Ball & Brosamer's 
motion for summary judgment. R. 526. However, it was not relied upon by the trial court in 
entering summary judgment in favor of UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer. The argument is 
presented here since the Utah Supreme Court has held that it "may affirm a grant of summary 
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.. UDOT AND BALL, BALL & BROSAMER FULFILLED IHE1K DL11 
OF PROVIDING A ROADWAY REASONABLY SAFE FOP TRAVEL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has hail ihui :i govcnimenUil enlih "h.i i IM'II-
delegable duty to exercise due care in maintainm.. • •• ^ 
boundaries in a reasonably sate umduiun b'i 11.11 1 tttwn \ Rivcrion City 
656P.2d434 , 4.V/ (Utah ll)N2>, MI, nho, i, u<>n>nifNl City, 834 P.2d 556, 
560 (Utah l I Ap|> \xNl\ ' Aiiimnj-ii Hie Iil.ili Supreme Court has never had 
occasion ti : . 1 ».UIM- i uuic• jurisdictions have held 
that the dui mil. irquirr-. Mi< i><iv<'i'iinuMital cntil> or contractor to maintain 
1 .. .:. • - Lists who are themselves exercising due care: 
The dut> ^ ^ Keep the highwa\ sate lot 1, j \ A himself exercising 
ordinary care, and a highway will be deema; s.ii; >.\ wiuu she usual 
requirements if it may be negotiated successfully by all hm tht • lost 
reckless and careless drivers, as there is n -w.,\ u-: M so coiwruct 
and maintain highways as to ins a the- sabix o! feckless driver-. 
judgment on any ground av a Libit to ilic n ial court, even if it is one not relied on buou 
Higgin. i Sdli ..Like County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (I'lab ;" '•< ^ . ,/v • "•" - ^'"-'• r-> ' ' ' 
Bank, 82" P 2t: :-•'. 246 (Tit;.). 1 wr 
i
 Since the Trujillos contend that Ball, Ball & Brovtmet. us a contractor performing work 
in the construction zone, had the same duty as the Department n! Iransportation to protect them 
from the acts of Mr. Griffin, we refer to cases on this subnet. :IIO-,I n-' -•v1v-u d^ ' <• -'h ' .»HK 
made against governmental entities. 
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40 C.J.S., Highways, § 258. See, also, Pickering v. State of Hawaii, 557 P.2d 
125 (Ha. 1976); Merritt v. City of Chester, 496 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Super. 1985); 
Helton v. Knox County, 922 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. 1996); Ruff v. County of King, 
887 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1995). 
In each of the cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court, the plaintiff had 
alleged some defect in the design or maintenance of the roadway itself, or in the 
manner in which traffic was warned of hazards, which was a proximate cause of 
the accident and resulting damages. For example, in Bramel v. Utah State Road 
Comm'n, 465 P.2d 534 (Utah 1970), the plaintiff contended that the Road 
Commission was negligent for failing to install appropriate signs warning of an 
abrupt turn in the roadway and, as a consequence, he lost control of his vehicle 
and was injured. In Carroll v. State Road Comm'n, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972), 
the plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle plunged into a wash across an 
abandoned state road and the State failed to warn that the roadway was 
abandoned and not suitable for travel. Id. at 889-90. 
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L Bowen r Riverton City, (0(> P.2d 4_i-J (I nan ll>,vii me |>l;nniilt vva\ 
injured in an automobile accident at an nueisccin n I in \*\ ldemr refl uiat a 
stop sign had fallen down arte .... >. u/i I Ihr h;iz;ird thus created 
within a reasonnok .;„ ' bountiful City, 834 
P.2d iOo ntiff allt*" ni thai because foliage 
obstructed ,.. i ;m mi<Msmio\ Bountiful City should have 
ii; ..... ^sulate traffic. Id. at 559. (The Utah Court of 
•- ntal entity had no common law duty to erect traffic 
In this case, the Tnijiilos have not alleged that any particular defect in the 
'« y itself caused Mi. Uiiilin to lose control of his vehicle and swerve mlo 
their lane of traffic. Although the Tnijiilos have suggested 
certain curves on the traveled way w r r "under <ICM_;. . . 
no evidence that the curve where the ia„iw, 
Moreover, nit Lrujiuos iU; . : >• *fect in ne luau was 
the proximate cause t-, .... .,. u;; own rxpen witness, Thomas 
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Alcorn, was unable to determine why Mr. Griffin lost control of his vehicle and 
swerved into the opposing lane of traffic: 
Q. Do you know whether or not that loss of control was 
due to speed or some other factor such as intoxication, 
fatigue or inattentiveness? 
A. I can't tell you how many factors were in it, no. 
Q. You have no way to really determine what caused the 
truck driver to veer off to the left? 
MR. FERGUSON: Truck driver? 
Q. (By Mr. Williams) The pickup truck driver, Mr. 
Griffin. 
A. No, I don't. 
R. 2269. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, p. 84). Although the Trujillos claim 
that Mr. Griffin's speed was a proximate cause of the accident, Mr. Alcorn was 
unable to determine whether speed was a factor in the accident: 
Q. In fact, you would merely be speculating, wouldn't you, 
at this point that speed was one of the factors that 
caused him to drive off the shoulder in the road prior to 
the accident occurring? 
A. A little more than speculation. It's very characteristic on 
our highways throughout the country as a causal factor 
in single vehicle, run-off-the-road accidents on the 
outside of a curve. 
Q. But you're making a general statement, correct? 
A. Yes. 
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~ A
"
J :t'~ not based on any particular tans 01 
investigation oi this case } 
(Id). 
, . . . ,... Li^ct in the 
!.u.u ,j • \iiiiatc cause 01 Mr. 
• known is dial x\x*. ^ ^ ^ was 
uvci direc times die k-^ai limit, and i. / i 
intoxication may have caused Mr. Griffin to lose consciousness, or become 
contused, dizz\, or iai, a^ww ,^ all of which could account for Mr. Griffin's loss 
of control. 
Stated in the context of the controlling legal authority .-.. l'rujillos Have 
failed to allege or present any expert testimony that the rnaUwa^ :•; • . 
construction area was not "reasonably saft • > : . . . . • • 
656P.2d434 A\ 7 11 itaii iw,v» II.. .. a. .IU
 :. 
reasonable care would he contused I 
into a * e i unii'juiat iotorist lauic 
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to negotiate the roadway at the posted speed limit, or that any alleged defect was 
in fact a proximate cause of this accident. Thus, because UDOT and Ball, Ball & 
Brosamer provided a roadway which was reasonably safe for travel, it fulfilled its 
duty to the Trujillos and the traveling public and summary judgment was 
appropriately granted. 
B. UDOT AND BALL, BALL & BROSAMER HAVE NO DUTY TO 
PROTECT ONE MOTORIST FROM THE RECKLESS ACTS OF 
ANOTHER MOTORIST. 
Unable to show that a specific defect in the roadway was a proximate cause 
of the accident, the Trujillos contend that the duty imposed upon UDOT and Ball, 
Ball, & Brosamer should be expanded to include a duty to protect one motorist 
from the negligent or reckless acts of another motorist if the acts or negligence 
can be deemed "foreseeable." Specifically, they argue that because it was 
"foreseeable" that a cross-over collision could occur in the construction zone, 
UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer should have installed portable concrete 
barriers to protect the Trujillos from the negligent, reckless, and intoxicated acts 
of Mr. Griffin. Ball, Ball & Brosamer respectfully contends that it has no duty to 
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protect one motorist from another moton^t - ., .< "ence h ..(. v 
through a construction site is limited to providing ">•.»;.«> -a1, tor 
travel. 
A i i h u i u i u -.,•. ' ^ ' ""' 
other junsaicuoi i ' • . lis hav** 
n o i i . i ,j , ,t-i-;«hi< . ^ •• , J S \ : by the 
( * * • • . > n" has iio duty to anticipate 
in? ">•• negligerr relation ol a uioioi v elude. ";, Puwei. .. ^Isiria •>/ 
Cohimbia 6 U A.2d 403
 vL>.u. >pp. 1993)(uDistiiwi ;:a_ HL generalized 
obligation to protect citizens from traffic accidents."); Daniel v. State of New 
Jersey, 571 A.2d 1329 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1990). For example, m Daniel, the New 
Jersey Court of Appeals held as follows: 
Applying these principles here, he Man. bears no greater oh. i 
than to construct and maintain is uuuh W, I reasonably safe 
condition for their intended use I'IK State does jiot owe A dm 
protect individuals against all of the foreseeably unsafe and 
unreasonable driv ;"" habits of others. The State fulfills its; ; 
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by providing roads that are reasonably safe for their objectively 
intended use. 
Daniel, 571 A.2d at 1342. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether 
a governmental entity and its contractors have a duty to protect citizens from 
negligent acts of other motorists, the analysis applied in other circumstances 
where a party claims another owes a duty of protection from the acts of third 
parties is helpful. The Utah Supreme Court has generally followed the "special 
relationship" reasoning of Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 314-320 (1965): 
We acknowledge the general applicability in Utah of the "special 
relation" analysis described in sections 314 through 320 of the 
Restatement of Torts. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§§ 314-320 (1965). A brief review of that concept will assist in 
understanding our disposition of plaintiffs' claim under section 319. 
Section 315 sets out the general tort principle that one has no duty to 
control the conduct of third persons. The Restatement then lists two 
exceptions to this general rule. First, if "a special relation exists 
between the actor and the third person," then the actor has a duty to 
"control the third person's conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 315 (1965). Second, if "a special relation exists between the 
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actoi" , J fhc plointiff +he pldiiuui
 ;:a- s itiin u |ihe aaur s] 
tectioi Niiihahh against harm n«>iu 'Mini p-rson< ' ' ' 
Rollins Petersen. M. » . . . • . i 
origina* owever. uie i .^a r> 
:^ Kestatemt , >K\ r . i 
pol : .-c\. .. , - ^elation shr • ! to 
exr •"" W / L u k t Louthj, 
I: '< . ' •••• • <••-.,
 t ,20 p.2d 41 J, 41b voiaii iJi>0„ «.io Court 
disc • v ! - -mil, iactors to be uui^ideied when determining if a duty exists: 
Determining whether one party has an affirmative duty to protect 
another from the other's own acts or those of a third party requires a 
4Section 315 provides: 
There is no duty so to control the co td.i.t of .i third person as to prevent 
him [or her] from causing physical harm to another unless 
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the umu
 ;- ->on 
V i '-IMPOSC?" " d u t y U p o r <l,'> r ' n ' - to > ™ H M I t\\,^ ilii'i-fl ner<;.in'- ;•. > inct , 
or 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which 
gives to the other a nghi !r nroiection 
Restatement (S. ... ioru ^ jID (i-no; ^ee genera v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 
1189 a It ah 1% . .', • !//:•-:.'•/-• f '••0P.2d20' -h 1981). 
careful consideration of the consequences for the parties and society 
at large. If the duty is realistically incapable of performance, or if it 
is fundamentally at odds with the parties' relationship, we should be 
loath to term that relationship "special" and to impose a resulting 
"duty," for it is meaningless to speak of "special relationships" and 
"duties" in the abstract. These terms are only labels which the legal 
system applies to defined situations to indicate that certain rights and 
obligations flow from them; they are "an expression of the sum total 
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a 
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." W. Prosser, Law of 
Torts, 333 (3d ed. 1964), quoted in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 
135, 138 (3d Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S.Ct. 
1836, 64L.Ed.2d261 (1980). 
Id. at 718. 
Ball, Ball & Brosamer contends that requiring UDOT and its contractors to 
protect motorists from "foreseeable" accidents caused solely by the negligence of 
other motorists is a duty realistically incapable of performance. The cost of 
eliminating all "foreseeable" automobile accidents, to the extent such a noble 
goal would be possible, would impose a crushing burden on UDOT and the 
taxpayers of the State of Utah. 
There is simply no feasible, cost effective means of eliminating cross-over 
collisions. A cross-over collision is possible and, indeed, "foreseeable" at every 
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point on Utah's roads where opposing lanes ol uaiiic arc 1101 scp.ii.Ucd U\ a 
protection from the hazards posed by an intoxicated driver who has lost control of 
wfiicle. 
A cross-over collision is possible and indeed "foreseeable" at any location 
where an intoxicated driver may roam. Indeed, the Traffic Control Plans 
developed by UDOT for the 1-84 project provided an added measure of safety not 
fourd oh most Utah roads where two-way, two lane traffic is the norm—barrels 
were placed between the traffic lanes to remind motorists to remain in their 
traffic lane i :cquirc UI.)() 1 and its contractors t<> plaic a concietc bai i icr 
down the miaatc 1 even highway, i n iaul nul nmitilinilinnil Micci in Hn 
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State to protect against a "foreseeable" cross-over collision is a duty simply 
incapable of performance. 
Another obstacle to implementation of a broad duty to protect one motorist 
from the negligence of other motorists is the sheer impossibility of designing 
guards which would prevent all "foreseeable" accidents. As set forth in the 
Statement of Facts, Bruce Swenson, the Region On Design Engineer for UDOT, 
has testified that barrier also poses a danger to small vehicles and eliminates the 
ability of emergency personnel to reach an accident scene. R.5 The Trujillos own 
expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, also acknowledged that barriers pose a danger. 
R. 2288-89. (Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, pp. 113-14). Shankar Narayanan 
also testified that placing barrier down the middle of the roadway would force 
east-bound traffic to drive between two barriers, thus raising the risk of a rear-
5
 Indeed, had UDOT used concrete barriers between the lanes of traffic, the Trujillos 
would have been tunneled between two barriers-one on the right to protect against collisions with 
worksite objects, and a second on the left to protect against westbound traffic. If an intoxicated 
motorist such as Mr. Griffin had been traveling eastbound under these circumstances, and lost 
control of his vehicle, other eastbound motorists such as the Trujillos may have been unable to 
avoid a collision with the disabled vehicle. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff would argue 
that UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer knew or should have know that such an accident was 
"foreseeable" and took steps to avoid it. 
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end collision, R. 1767 See, Robinson v Estate oj Haynes, 509 So 2d 128 
/ T _ r-^4. A
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\ - u l i t C M l i i l O J U * i >ti^^L ^ , , j ; 
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nor i... :^ .* , 
^
 i
 which may De used 10 
• i.^le hazaiu, &uwi ab concrete barrier^. 
6
 The accident involving Linda Thomas highlights the dangers of focusing on one single 
type of accident. The Court may recall from the Trujillos^ Statement of Facts that Mi Thon..i> 
was involved in an accident some six weeks prior to the Trujillos at cident in which siie lost 
control over her vehicle and crossed the median after she drifted to 'he side of the road and <. >• r 
corrected (there was no barrier on the right side of traffic in that location). The Trujilios dv -n 
the similarity of that accident with their own, I lowever, they fail ^ acknow ledge that if UD< >T 
and Ball, Ball & Brosamer had adopted their proposed solution and installed barrier between ihe 
two lanes of traffic at milepost 107, Ms. Thomas and her 14-year-oid daughter would not h;r. ,' 
crossed the median, narrowly missed a truck, and walked away from the accident. Rather. .:. -
would have slammed into the barrier proposed by the Trujillos and their expert witness, and 
likely suffered either serious injury or been killed like Mr. Griffin. While it may seem so simple 
to the Trujillos to place a barrier down the middle of the roadway to protect them from Mr. 
Griffin, they, unlike UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer, need not consider the fact that such a 
decision would consign Linda Thomas, her daughter, and any other person over correcting alter a 
minor deviation from, the roadway to probable death 
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Rather, UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer must consider whether 
implementing one means of separating traffic will cause other types of accidents 
and injuries, and whether in the event of an accident, emergency personnel would 
be able to reach the site. In fact, in their entire 97-page memorandum before the 
trial court, and their brief before the Utah Supreme Court, neither the Trujillos 
nor their expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, have ever presented any solution to the 
problem of preventing cross-over collisions without creating hazards and causing 
other "foreseeable" accidents. 
Other jurisdictions which have faced this issue have likewise concluded 
that neither a governmental entity nor its contractor owe a duty to protect 
motorists from the reckless or negligent conduct of other motorists. Klein v. City 
of Seattle, 705 P.2d 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Diegel v. City of West Fargo, 
546 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1996); Merritt v. City of Chester, 496 A.2d 1220 
(Pa.Super. 1985); Ruff v. County of King, 887 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1995)(en banc); 
Warda v. State, 256 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Ct.Cl. N.Y. 1964); Church of Jesus Christ 
ofLatter.Day Saints v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 431 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); 
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Powell v. District of Columbia, 634 A.2d 403 (D.< App \{MS), PeUiii v 
Broadview Heights, 601 N I. Jx\ I''' M ()hio App I' >'' 11 Pickering \ Snuv of 
Hawaii, 557 P 2d 125 (11a ll)7(>). Miinnmp v Ihrckamp W) N l< .M I H>8 
(111. App -
he eastbound laiies hi a 
: • • ucaied and driving at over twice 
1
 • int median and a iicau un collision occurred. The 
Washington Couii oi Appeals stated as follows: 
The City was under no duty to protect ROLKM K from the extreme 
carelessness of Mullens. As a matter of public policy, the ( nv 
cannot be expected to guard against this J eg;••••. • -.\~ negligent unvho-
Seuellv. Darnell, 209 NT ^ 4 S3 s I '" . 11936* To 
impose liability on the City undei these an. jinstarces vwski-
force the construction of our highway n.»i im Uie <;se 
and safety of the reasonable prudent motoric hut M.K-J\ 
for the purpose of protecting that motorist from ilk 
depredations and negligence oi the reckless, careless, 
and drunken operator. No -uch insurance nolirv hns 
been or can be imposed upon the defendai -
Warda v. State, 45 Misc.2d 38^ ?^ N Y S 2d 
Id. at 807-08. The Warda case referred to by the Washington Court of Appeals 
also involved a head-on collision. There, the decedents were driving south when 
a north bound vehicle "jumped the median" and collided with them. Warda, 256 
N.Y.S.2d at 1008. The plaintiffs claimed that the State was negligent for not 
installing barriers which would prevent such a cross-over accident. The Court 
declined to do so, concluding that "to impose an obligation of guarding against 
the gross negligence of an operator of a vehicle is not within the purview of the 
decisions of this State." Id. at 1010. 
InDiegel v. City of West Fargo, 546 N.W.2d 367 (N.D.1996), two 
motorists approached a railroad crossing which was raised such that oncoming 
vehicles could not see each other prior to the crossing. A head-on collision 
ensured . In affirming summary judgment for the governmental entity, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court stated: 
Driving an automobile on any road or street presents some degree of 
inherent danger. Our decisions, however, do not require a 
municipality to be an insurer against accidents on streets. Rather, 
the foregoing cases illustrate the resolution of a municipality's duty 
involves whether the condition of the street is unreasonably 
dangerous for a driver exercising ordinary care. 
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Id. at 372. 
The Trujillos focus on the fact that a cross-over collision was admitted to 
be "foreseeable" in the two-way, two-lane operations (as it is on virtually all 
other roadways). In Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P. 2d 49 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supeme Court stressed that foreseeability is only one 
factor be considered when determining whether a duty exists: 
"Whether the law imposes a duty does not depend upon 
foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the 
burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that 
burden upon defendant must also be taken into account." 
Id. (quoting Lance v. Senior, 224 M.E. 231 (111. 1967). In DiBenedetto v. Flora 
Township, 605 N.E.2d 571 (111. 1992), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated: 
Foreseeability is but one of the factors to be weighed in determining 
the existence of a duty. Even if an accident is foreseeable, the 
resulting burdens and consequences must also be considered before a 
legal duty will be recognized. While this accident was foreseeable to 
the extent that, in retrospect, all accidents are foreseeable, this is not 
sufficient to enlarge the township's duty. It is, of course, both 
foreseeable and commonplace that cars will occasionally run into 
ditches. The instant case, however, is not the type of accident one 
would expect to occur under normal driving circumstances. 
Id. at 574. 
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Before the trial court and again before this Court, the Trujillos have 
provided no meaningful argument to support its claim that Ball, Ball & Brosamer 
owed the Trujillos a duty. In fact, before the trial court, the Trujillos sole 
response to this entire contention was to note that in Klein v. City of Seattle, 705 
P.2d 806 (Wash.Ct.App. 1985), the intoxicated driver was traveling at over 
twice the speed limit, whereas here, Mr. Griffin was traveling within the posted 
speed limit. 
Ball, Ball & Brosamer certainly agrees that each case involving a drunken 
driver is distinguishable. The only predictable thing which can be said about 
intoxicated motorists is that their actions are unpredictable. There are few 
consistent patterns to the time, place, and manner in which they injure other 
motorists, which supports Ball, Ball & Brosamer's contention that to impose a 
burden requiring it and UDOT to protect other motorists from a drunken driver's 
negligence or respond in damages is a duty realistically incapable of 
performance. 
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While this accident was indeed tragic, it was not the result of any defect on 
the roadway. The road itself was easily negotiable by all motorists exercising 
reasonable care. The accident was caused by the reckless driving of an 
intoxicated driver over whom neither UDOT nor Ball, Ball & Brosamer had any 
control. To require these entities to do more than provide a roadway reasonably 
safe for travel would impose a duty which simply cannot be fulfilled. 
II. 
BALL, BALL & BROSAMER CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE 
BECAUSE IT FOLLOWED THE PLANS AND 
SPECIFICATIONS PROVIDED BY UDOT. 
The Trujillos divide their argument with respect to the plans and 
specifications into two sections. The first deals with whether Ball, Ball & 
Brosamer shares in the State of Utah's tort immunity because it adhered to the 
plans and specifications supplied by UDOT. This argument is based on a remark 
to this effect in the trial court's bench ruling. R. 1182. However, the Order of 
the trial court provided as its basis as follows: 
2. Furthermore, the Court also finds that 3B's, as contractor, in 
carrying out the plans and specifications for 1-84 drafted by UDOT, 
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acted in accordance with the plans and specifications which were not 
so unreasonably dangerous that a reasonable contractor would not 
perform and carry out said plans and specifications. 
R. 1034-35. 
Although there is support for the trial court's statement from the bench, 
Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 773 (D.Utah 1982); Vanchieri v. New 
Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 514 A.2d 1323, 1326 (N.J. 1986); Simons v. 
Tri-State Constr. Co., 655 P.2d 703 (Wash. 1983), we focus our arguments on 
the trial court's Order, since it is the Order which is being appealed. Moreover, 
as set forth below, the public policy arguments supporting both the Order and the 
oral statement are similar and are discussed interchangeably. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule holding that a contractor 
who follows plans and specifications which are not obviously dangerous is not 
subject to liability for defects in the plans. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
1972); Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co, 404 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 
1965). For example, in Leininger, the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
One important limitation recognized in several cases is that the 
contractor is not liable if he has merely carried out carefully the 
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plans, specifications, and directions given him since in that case the 
responsibility is assumed by the employer, at least where the plans 
are not so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow 
them. 
Leininger, 404 P.2d at 37. 
An excellent illustration of this principle is found mAndrus v. State, 541 
P.2d 1117 (Utah 1972). There, a road was designed without proper drainage, 
which resulted in flooding on the plaintiffs property. In dismissing the 
contractor, Gibbons & Reed, the Court held: 
Gibbons & Reed having performed its contract with the State in 
accordance with the plans, specifications, and directions given it by 
the State with a reasonable degree of skill, we find no basis upon 
which to find that the contractor was liable to the plaintiffs. 
A*, at 1121. 
This rule has particular application when the contractor performs work for 
a governmental entity which provides the plans and specifications. For example, 
in Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 773 (D.Utah 1982), the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah states as follows: 
The question of foreseeability of harm and the possible need to 
protect against it arose when the Government framed its terms. 
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There is no charge that what the contractor did was not what it was 
required to do. Rather, it is that it was negligent in failing to 
provide some subsequent safeguard against the subsequent escape of 
fumes. Yet, as stated above, this was a decision which rested with 
the Government. The Government did not provide for such 
additional precautions in the plans, and the Western Contracting 
Corp. is not to be held liable for this omission. See Myers v. United 
States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); Jemison v. Duplex, 163 
F.Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1958). To impose liability on the contractor 
under such circumstances would render the Government's immunity 
for the consequences of acts in the performance of a "discretionary 
function" meaningless, for if the contractor was held liable, contract 
prices to the Government would be increased to cover the 
contractor's risk of loss from possible harmful effects of complying 
with decisions of executive officers authorized to make policy 
judgments. 
Id. at 804-05. See also, Vanchieri v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 
514 A.2d 1323, 1326 (N.J. 1986). 
In this case, there is no evidence that Ball, Ball & Brosamer failed to carry 
out the plans and specifications provided by UDOT relating to traffic control. 
Moreover, there is no evidence or testimony that the plans and specifications 
were so dangerous that a reasonable contractor would not follow them.7 
7
 The Trujillos rely upon a portion of the record, R. 652-59, and contends that Mr. Alcorn 
testified that Ball, Ball & Brosamer should have known the plans and specifications were 
unreasonably dangerous. The cited record section is a portion of the Trujillos' memorandum 
opposing the motions for summary judgment filed by both defendants. That portion of the 
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The Trujillos have divided their argument into three parts: (1) lane 
separation; (2) speed, and (3) investigation of accidents. Ball, Ball & Brosamer 
will address each of these concerns in turn. 
A. LANE SEPARATION 
As noted by the Trujillos, the Utah Department of Transportation, like 
most other states, has adopted the MUTCD as the model for implementation of 
traffic control devices. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the Trujillos' 
expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, acknowledged that concrete barriers are not 
required in order to separate two-way, two-lane operations under all 
circumstances. Rather, the design engineer must make a judgment based on 
several factors as to whether barriers would be appropriate. R 2288. 
Mr. Alcorn concluded that the use of barrels was appropriate through 
much of the project, but that barriers should have been installed between 
record contains no reference to the plans being unreasonably dangerous. In fact, neither the word 
"unreasonably" nor "dangerous" appear in that portion of the record, either together or 
individually. 
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mileposts 107 and 109 because of a high accident rate prior to inception of the 
project. R. 2282. 
Mr. Alcorn's opinion that the plans and specifications were defective is 
based not solely on a review of the plans. Indeed, he believes that the plans and 
specifications using barrels to separate traffic is appropriate through certain areas 
of the project. Rather, his opinion that barrier should have been used between 
mileposts 107 and 109 is based on a review of the accidents occurring in that 
area prior to construction. 
There is no evidence that Ball, Ball & Brosamer had access to the accident 
information utilized by Mr. Alcorn in reaching his conclusion prior to the 
initiation of the project, nor that it had any duty to obtain that accident 
information prior to beginning work. Rather, it was entitled to rely on the plans 
and specification as provided by UDOT, and not even Mr. Alcorn feels 
competent to render an opinion that the plans and specifications upon which Ball, 
Ball & Brosamer relied were so obviously dangerous that no reasonable 
contractor would have relied upon them. In fact, no expert witness has ever 
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rendered an opinion that the plans and specifications were so obviously dangerous 
that no reasonable contractor would rely upon them. 
The Trujillos rely upon the letter of Shanker Narayanan dated March 25, 
1995, to Larry Durrant. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Narayanan 
was concerned about the spacing of the barrels and the risk of cross-over 
accidents due to inadequate delineation of the lanes. The Trujillos have presented 
no evidence that the spacing of the barrels at 100 foot intervals was a proximate 
cause of this accident, nor have they presented evidence that Mr. Narayanan did 
or would have recommended the use of barriers to remedy the problem 
identified. 
Indeed, Mr. Narayanan testified that he felt that the use of barrier would 
increase the risk of rear-end collisions and would impede the ability to move 
rescue personnel to the scene. R. 1767-1770. When asked if he thought it was 
more safe to use barriers or barrels, Mr. Narayanan was unsure which was more 
safe: 
Q. Do you know whether it is more safe to use concrete 
barriers or barrels in the situation you had at 1-84? 
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A. (No response.) 
Q. Do you know one way or the other? 
A. No. I mean, it's a hard one to answer. 
Q. There are pros and cons? 
A. Pros and cons on both. 
R. 1772. (Deposition of Shanker Narayanan, p. 108, attached as Exhibit "3"). 
Interestingly, even the Trujillos' expert, Thomas Alcorn, would agree that 
the use of barrels throughout much of the project was appropriate. Mr. Alcorn's 
sole criticism was that barrier was not used at selected locations with high 
accident rates, and as set forth above, there is no evidence that Mr. Narayanan 
was aware of these accident rates or that he had any reason to know that the use 
of barrels in those locations was anything but appropriate. 
As set forth in the Trujillos' Statement of Facts, Mr. Narayanan testified 
that he discussed the use of barriers and barrels with Larry Durrant, the project 
manager for UDOT, but received the impression that barriers could not be used 
because it would limit access by emergency vehicles. R. 1696-97. Mr. Durrant 
does not recall these conversations. Whether Mr. Narayanan and Mr. Durrant 
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discussed the use of barriers is irrelevant to the disposition of Ball, Ball & 
Brosamer's motion for summary judgment. 
The Trujillos must show that the plans and specifications were so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable contractor would have built the project using barrels 
rather than barrier. It is the fact that their own expert witness, Thomas Alcorn, 
testified that the use of barrels was suitable through much of the project, and only 
became dangerous if one knew of the prior accident rates, which warrants 
summary judgment for Ball, Ball & Brosamer. Whether Mr. Durrant and Mr. 
Narayanan discussed these issues is irrelevant to the issue upon which the Court 
granted summary judgment. 
There is no evidence that the plans and specifications were so obviously 
dangerous that no reasonable contractor would follow them. The plans were 
reviewed by five to twelve engineers within UDOT, by the Federal Highway 
Administration, and by eight contractors who bid on the project. There is no 
evidence that anyone from any source advocated or recommended the use of 
barriers as opposed to barrels prior to this accident. In fact, the Trujillos have 
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presented no evidence from any contractor or other expert witness that the plans 
and specifications were so obviously dangerous no reasonable contractor would 
follow them. 
B. SPEED 
The Trujillos rely upon the testimony of their expert witness, Thomas 
Alcorn, with respect to their contention that the speed limit established by UDOT 
on this roadway violated federal law. Specifically, Mr. Alcorn testified that 
"federal law said if it's two way, two lane, it's 55." (Deposition of Thomas 
Alcorn, p. 81). Even assuming Mr. Alcorn is correct,8 the Trujillos have failed to 
demonstrate that this failure to reduce the speed limit had anything at all to do 
8
 Mr. Alcorn has never provided the basis for his contention that federal law mandated a 
55 mile per hour speed limit along this roadway. Utah provides that the roadway may be 65 
miles per hour "on highways where this speed limit does not impair the ability of the state to 
qualify for federal highway funds." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46 (1993). 23 U.S.C. § 154 
(which has since be repealed) provided that "the Secretary of Transportation shall not approve 
any project under section 106 which has . . . (2) a maximum speed limit on any highway within 
its jurisdiction on the Interstate System located outside of an urbanized area of 50,000 population 
or more in excess of 65 miles per hour." Interstate-84 qualifies for federal funds with a speed 
limit of 65 miles per hour. Although Mr. Alcorn attempts to render a legal opinion as to the 
availability of funds for Utah if the speed limit on 1-84 through the construction area is left at 65 
miles per hour, he is unable to even provide the statute or regulation he attempts to construe. 
Naturally, even if Mr. Alcorn was able to locate the statute upon which he relies, his opinion 
would be inadmissible as an impermissible legal conclusion. Durham v. Duchesne County, 893 
P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995). 
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with the accident or their injuries. Mr. Alcorn opined that he would have 
reduced the regulatory speed limit from 65 miles per hour to 55 miles per hour: 
Q In your opinion, what would have been the proper-so are you 
saying that 55 miles an hour should have been the proper 
mandatory speed? 
A. I would say overall, looking at the project, the posted 
regulatory speed limit should have been reduced to 55, max. 
(Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, pp. 88-9, attached as Exhibit "1"). 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Trujillo testified that he was 
driving about 45-50 miles per hour at the time of the accident, well within the 
suggested speed proposed by Mr. Alcorn. R. 581. (Deposition of Alan Trujillo, 
p. 43, attached as Exhibit "7"). Trooper Michael Loveland, who investigated the 
accident for the Utah Highway Patrol, testified that Mr. Griffin was traveling at 
58 miles per hour at the time of the accident. R. 583. Based on this information, 
Mr. Alcorn was unable to conclude that speed was a cause of the accident. R. 
2269. 
Proximate cause if defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,) produces the injury and 
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without which the result would not have occurred." Mitchell v. Pearson Enter., 
697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). There is absolutely no evidence in the record 
that had Mr. Griffin been traveling 55 miles per hour as recommended by Mr. 
Alcorn instead of 58 miles per hour, the accident would not have occurred. 
There is simply no basis concluding that speed was a factor in this accident 
and, thus, there are no grounds under which UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer 
could be held liable, even if maintaining the speed limit at 65 miles per hour was 
negligent. More importantly for this discussion, there is no testimony from any 
witness, expert or otherwise, that the plans and specifications with the 65 mile 
per hour speed limit maintained were so unreasonably dangerous that no 
reasonable contractor would have performed the work. 
C. INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS. 
The Trujillos' speculate that had UDOT and Ball, Ball & Brosamer tracked 
accidents within the construction zone, they would have discovered the Linda 
Thomas accident which occurred some six weeks prior to the accident and 
installed barriers to prevent cross-over collisions. Even assuming that Ball, Ball 
48 
& Brosamer, as a contractor, had a legal duty to monitor accidents occurring 
through the construction zone, there is no evidence that UDOT would have 
installed barrier through the construction zone. 
Both Mont Smith, the Safety Risk Manager for Region I, and Bruce 
Swenson, the design supervisor, have testified that absent "horrendous statistics," 
UDOT would not have used barrier through the construction site. R. 2168-69, 
1921. There is no evidence from any source that had Ball, Ball & Brosamer 
learned of the accident involving Linda Thomas, it would have recommended the 
use of barriers or that UDOT would have adopted that recommendation. 
In sum, there is no evidence from any witness, including the Trujillos' own 
expert witness, that the plans and specifications were so unreasonably dangerous 
that no reasonable contractor would follow them. In fact, Mr. Alcorn believed 
the use of barrels to be quite appropriate throughout much of the project. Mr. 
Alcorn has never stated that simply by reviewing the plans, it was apparent that 
the plans were defective. Rather, he contends that UDOT failed to consider all 
the relevant factors before using barrels at high accident locations. There is no 
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evidence from any source that Ball, Ball & Brosamer participated in the design 
process, nor is there evidence from any competent witness that a contractor 
possessing only the plans could have concluded the plans were defective. Thus, 
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Ball, Ball & Brosamer. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ball, Ball & Brosamer respectfully requests that 
the summary judgment entered by the trial court be affirmed. 
DATED MsM day of June, 1998. 
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE 
Stephen 
Joseph E. Minnock 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Ball, Ball & Brosamer 
G. Morgan 
50 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the # 6 day of June, 1998,1 caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing document to be mailed, postage pre-paid to the 
following: 
Gary B. Ferguson 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Mark J. Williams 
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE 
4 Triad Center, #500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
James E. Phillips 
PHILLIPS & LANCASTER 
822 Main Street 
Evanston, WY 82930 
51 
Tabl 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-O-
ALAN TRUJILLO AND SHARON 
TRUJILLO, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
-V-
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION; BALL, BALL & 
BROSAMER, INC., A CALIFORNIA 
CORPORATION; AND JOHN DOES 
I THROUGH X, 
DEFENDANTS. 
CIVIL NO. 960907179PI 
(JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON) 
DEPOSITION OF: 
THOMAS L. ALCORN 
-O-
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 4TH DAY OF AUGUST, 
1997, THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS L. ALCORN WAS TAKEN 
PURSUANT TO NOTICE, COMMENCING AT 10:40 A.M. OF SAID DAY 
AT HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, #4 TRIAD 
CENTER, SUITE 500, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, BEFORE SUSAN 
HELLBERG-YOUNG, A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AND NOTARY 
PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
-O-
ORIGINAL 
iccl?> Mcurtolri 
I c | c i t l r $ §efvlce,lrt. 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
Statewide Reporting 
National and Merit Certified Reporters 
Expedited Delivery 
Computerized Transcription 
IBM Compatible Disks 
Litigation Support Software 
Video Depositions 
gTTJgflW H t f M w 
II A* Okay, it would not be my opinion that the 
2 J barrels would be below the national standard in much of the 
3 project, with the speed limit reduced, posted regulatory 
4 I speed limit reduced and warnings for substandard sections for 
5 I that speed. 
6 Q. So barrels would not be a violation of the 
7 national standard, correct? 
8 MR. FERGUSON: In certain areas, he said. 
9 Q. (By Mr. Williams) And I was going to go on to 
10 that. You're saying that they in and of themselves would not 
11 I be a violation of national standard in a two-way, two-lane 
12 J operation, and then you qualified that by saying in certain 
13 J areas, and I believe you also said with reduction of the 
14 J regulatory speed limit? 
15 I A. That's correct. 
16 Q. And what other qualifiers did you have on that? 
17 J A. Well, you can't use channelizing devices by 
18 themselves. They have to be used in combination with the 
19 pavement striping to meet the directive if you're going to 
20 consider it as a separation device. 
21 Q. In combination with pavement striping? 
22 A. Sure. You have to mark the center. 
23 I Q. On both sides? 
24 I A. That's correct. 
25 I Q. And that was done here, wasn't it? 
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1 I A. The pictures show it was, yes. 
2 1 Q. If the speed limit had been reduced, and here 
3 I again you're talking about regulatory speed limit, correct? 
4 I A. Yes. 
5 Q. To 50 miles an hour, are you saying 50 or 55? 
6 1 A. I would think that the state would probably do 
7 it 55. 
8 I Q. If it had been reduced to 55, and they had 
9 J utilized barrels with striping, would that have, in your 
10 J mind, comported with the national standard for construction 
11 J zone safety? 
12 A. To start off with, in a generic situation, that 
13 would be the minimum standard to comply with the manual, and 
14 that is through a project that didn't have other features. 
15 Q. And talking about this specific project, is 
16 J there anything else that they would have needed besides the 
17 55-mile-an-hour regulatory speed limit and the barrels with 
18 J the proper striping on both sides? 
19 A. Well, certainly they have to take into 
20 J consideration their geometries here. There's a tremendous 
21 concern about horizontal curvature. There's some substandard 
22 I sections in curvature that meets, even if it meets minimum 
23 AASHTO criteria, and you also have extremely high accident 
24 J rates in the section that we are talking about. 
25 J Q. What were the high accident rates that you're 
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1 I either federal or state code? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 J Q. And off the top of your head, you don't know 
4 I those? 
5 A. No. I usually tie just to the federal 
6 J regulations and the states about those to get federal aid. 
7 J Q. Number three, UDOT failed to provide positive 
8 J barrier through sections with overrepresented accident rates 
9 J to prevent head-on collisions. Have you already stated your 
10 I opinion in connection with that? 
11 I A. Yes. I just want to make clear that I'm not 
12 I saying that you need barrier from one end of this project to 
13 I the other, that there are sections that should have been 
14 I looked at with high accident rates that need barrier. 
15 I Q. Any other sections besides 107 through 109? 
16 J A. Not from the data that I have. One section, 
17 J there was — you have two other horizontal curves that have a 
18 J problem, and I didn't convert those to mileposts, so I can't 
19 I tell you exactly where they are at. 
20 Q. Okay, when you say horizontal curve, you're 
21 I talking about winding side to side? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Vertical would be hills? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. I always have to think in terms of my vertical 
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1 I what before they start making decisions about what they are 
2 J going to put in? 
3 I A. They should take into consideration not only 
4 I that this is a two-lane, two-way operation on a roadway, but 
5 I it's a two-lane, two-way roadway operation on this particular 
6 I section of roadway that has problems in certain areas. 
7 Q. You're saying that UDOT didn't do that? 
8 1 A. I'm saying they did not do that. 
9 I Q. What else didn't they take into consideration? 
10 J A. On page 182 with the diagram TA-39, it 
11 J basically tells anyone using it on long-term projects on high 
12 I speed highways, consideration should be given to the use of 
13 J barriers as a separation device. 
14 J Q. Is it your opinion that no consideration to 
15 J those factors was given? 
16 I A. I haven't seen any consideration in the 
17 J information I have for barriers as a separation device. 
18 I Q. That doesn't mandate that barriers are used in 
19 order to comply with the MUTCD, does it? 
20 J A. This does not mandate it, no. 
2 1
 I Q. In other words, it's left up to the discretion 
22 I of the designer and the other officials who are actually 
23 J designing the project? 
2 4
 J A. Taking into consideration the other 
25 I requirements in the manual, traffic engineering study be 
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II Q. Are you utilizing that experience for the 
2 I purpose of expressing any opinions that you've expressed 
3 today? 
4 I A. No. 
5 I Q. Calling your attention to Exhibit 72, you were 
6 I asked to during a break write down your opinions that you 
7 I were going to express in this case; is that correct? 
8 I A. Yes. 
9 Q. And you had about how long to write down those 
10 J opinions during the break? 
11 J A. I believe I took 10 or 15 minutes. 
12 J Q. And having written down those opinions, then 
13 I you were asked questions with regards to them once the 
14 J deposition commenced; is that correct? 
15 J A. Yes, sir. 
16 I Q. When you first wrote down your opinions on 
17 J Exhibit 72, before you were asked a question, am I correct 
18 J that on opinion number four, the slash and Three Bees was not 
19 there when you first wrote it down? 
20 I A. You're correct. 
21 Q. Once you were asked questions, when you were 
22 J reading number four, your counsel turned over to you and 
23 I briefly conversed with you, and you added Three Bees; is that 
24 I correct? 
25 A. That's correct. 
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1 I Q. Mr. Narayanan? 
2 I A. Yes. 
3 Q. What is it that you can recall that you're 
4 J relying upon? 
5 A. I remember him saying he was also concerned 
6 about vehicles hitting the barrels. It was difficult to keep 
7 I the barrels in place because of the number of hits, and that 
8 I the barrels themselves create problems because they are not 
9 I in the appropriate place. 
10 I Q. Anything else? 
11 J A. I don't recall anything. 
12 J Q. So outside of the letter and what you just 
13 I testified to, you are not aware of anything other than items 
14 I that Mr. Narayanan or Three Bees were concerned about? 
15 J MR. FERGUSON: Objection, misstates his answer, 
16 I he said those are the things that he could recall at this 
17 I time from Mr. Narayanan's deposition, not that he was aware 
18 of. 
19 THE WITNESS: That's all I recall. 
2 0
 J Q. (By Mr. Morgan) In your opinion, do concrete 
21 J barriers constitute a hazard in and of themselves? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. why is that? 
2 4
 J A. They are rigid objects. The criteria for the 
25 I use of the barrier is very clear, you only use a barrier when 
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the hazard of hitting the barrier is less than the hazard of 
hitting the object that the barrier is protecting. 
Q. Do you have an opinion with regards to — 
strike that. 
Are you familiar with the term comfort zone in 
traveling next to concrete barriers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What does that mean, in your opinion? 
A. It simply says that there's a distance close to 
the barrier that people do not like to be, and we know by our 
capacity analysis that we can reduce the capacity facility if 
we are too close to the barriers. People are not comfortable 
being right up against them. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. They are difficult to discern as far as their 
location. They are not real obvious, they are not typically 
delineated well. People just don't like to drive that close 
to something as rigid and solid as a barrier is. 
Q. Have there been any studies made how far they 
tend to shy away from the barriers in terms of feet? 
A. I believe that we — yes, there are. There are 
statistics on where people will drive. I don't recall what 
they are. 
Q. Do you have any general knowledge in that 
regard at all? 
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early on in the project. 
Why did Jim want to use barrels? 
What did he say to you that 
led you to believe that he wanted to use 
barrels instead of barriers? 
Well, we prior to that had used lane separation 
things as minimal as just a double yellow line. 
You know. I see things up in Idaho that are 
far less than what we use. 
We had to go to at least 
something that was AASHTO approved, something 
that was acceptable as far as the feds were 
concerned. Some of the things that you do on a 
project, you want to make very sure that you 
have federal concurrence. 
That's why we have plan in 
hand reviews. That's why we have PS & E 
reviews, so that those things aren't decided by 
just one person. They're decided by a team of 
individuals. 
Why did Jim want to use barrels instead of 
barriers? 
Probably several reasons. 
Can you tell me? 
Cost would be one. Barrier is a dangerous 
acceptable by the feds for this traffic plan, 
right? 
They could have been, yes. 
Any other reasons to your knowledge why Jim 
Thompson didn't use barriers instead of 
barrels? 
Well, yes. 
What other reason? 
I remember talking about emergency vehicles. 
You can't just leap a barrier with emergency 
vehicles. If you do have to chase them around, 
you have to chase them clear up and around an 
interchange. 
Any other reasons you can recall that Jim 
Thompson considered? 
It wasn't just Jim Thompson. These were 
Swenson and Jim Thompson. 
That's fine. Any other reasons why you chose 
barrels instead of barriers? 
Not that I can recall right now. 
Can you show me anything in writing that you 
had at the time that would tell you how much 
portable concrete barriers would have cost for 
traffic separation versus what barrels would 
have cost? 
object in and of itself. It has a tendency to 
roll small vehicles particularly. 
Jim was just as astute as 
anyone about watching out for the little guy, 
you might say. Because the little haunch that 
comes up on those barriers, they're called a 
Jersey barrier, and a small vehicle gets up on 
them and, poof, it's right over on its top. 
We use the barrels in lieu of 
just a double yellow line. Double yellow line 
wasn't acceptable. We had thought about a 
little raised curb, but at that speed a little 
raised curb is a little -- it doesn't really do 
a heck of a lot for you. That has a tendency 
to roll vehicles as well. 
We thought about candlesticks. 
That isn't an acceptable. We almost went to 
vertical panels. We had used vertical panels 
in a lot of instances, and they're not -- all 
of those things that I mentioned aren't 
acceptable means to separate traffic. 
The barrels are what the feds 
figure are an acceptable barrier -- acceptable 
traffic separation. 
Barriers were also an acceptable traffic --
1 barrier or barrel placement, any conversations 
2 dealing with them. 
3 Q. The first sentence in Deposition Exhibit 3 
4 states, this letter is to reiterate our 
5 concerns with regard to UDOT's less than 
6 adequate traffic control design for this 
7 proj ect. 
8 In your opinion was this 
9 traffic control design for this project less 
10 than adequate? Or was it adequate? 
11 A. I think it was adequate. 
12 Q. In terms of the kind of review that this 
13 traffic control design for this project went 
14 through, could you just reiterate for me 
15 starting with how the project plan is initiated 
16 what it goes through and what people pass or 
17 approve this project plan? 
18 MR. WILLIAMS: Are you 
19 limiting this to within UDOT or outside UDOT, 
20 including federal people? 
21 MR. MORGAN: Both. 
22 THE WITNESS:- To begin with, 
23 we go through a scoping review in which we just 
24 have -- we kind of outline the types of things 
25 we're going to do on the project. That's with 
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1 just -- it can be with as little of a plan as, 
2 say, the original construction plan that was 
3 completed 30 years ago. 
4 We just kind of demonstrate at 
5 that time what the project parameters are going 
6 to be. Beginning project, end project. We 
7 talk about the paving that we want to do on the 
8 project. We talk about how we think we're 
9 going to handle traffic on the project. 
10 One of the primary issues on 
11 that project was the interchange by Morgan 
12 itself, in that we had a sight distance problem 
13 on the westbound off ramp at Morgan, and we 
14 wanted to change that westbound off ramp 
15 location so that people could actually see it 
16 as it was coming up. 
17 There were drainage issues 
18 that the maintenance guy brought up. That's in 
19 the minutes. But the process requires you to 
20 have a scoping --
21 Q. Let me just interrupt you for a minute. 
22 Starting with the scoping, and you use the word 
23 we. Can you just tell me if we includes 
24 engineers? 
25 A. Yes. 
On each one of these levels? 
Yes. 
Just indicate the nature of the engineers 
involved. 
We'd have somebody from the division of safety, 
would be a safety engineer specifically. We 
would have a lot more people invited than 
sometimes attend. 
But that usually includes as 
well a materials engineer, a geotechnical 
engineer if we have a project that had a 
geotechnical problem, a structural engineer, a 
construction engineer, both from a local level 
construction as well as central office. The 
central office is the deputy construction 
engineers. 
After we've had that 
meeting --
The scoping meeting? 
The scoping. We go to a -- we put our set of 
plans together, and that plan at that time for 
a plan in hand review doesn't include the 
quantities. It includes everything but 
quantities, and, as plans are laid out, 
quantities are always found in sheet number 
10b 
1 I three. 
2 I This particular generation of 
3 plan you see over here is the plan in hand 
4 copy. It has no quantity sheets in it. So, 
5 we're just looking for things on the project 
6 without addressing any of the project costs. 
7 We have an approximation of 
8 project costs at that time, but that's all it 
9 is is an approximation. 
10 Q. Those involved in the plan in hand meeting? 
11 A. Are those same folks I just described. Always 
12 someone from division of safety, structures, 
13 because we had structure rehab work, 
14 construction, looking for constructability of 
15 the project, the maintenance guys. 
16 There are usually on any 
17 project about anywhere from five to around a 
18 dozen engineers in those meetings. 
19 Q. So, what happens after the plan in hand 
20 meeting? 
21 A. Then we address the comment to the plan in hand 
22 and calculate quantities for the project. 
23 After we've done that we have --
24 Q. We, is that the same folks? 
25 A. That's the same folks. 
w* 
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Q. Which include the five to 12 engineers? 
A. Yes. 
3 I Q. All right. 
4 A. Have another meeting called a PS & E meeting, 
5 which includes plans, special provisions, and 
6 estimate, where we sit around a table in a 
7 conference room and beat up each page in the 
8 plan. We go through the plan page by page as 
9 well as the special provisions page by page. 
10 And the estimate page by page. 
11 Q. Does that include the same folks? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. The five to 12 engineers? 
14 A. Yes. Like I say it -- the thing about that is 
15 the representation from safety particularly is 
16 usually a hundred percent. I've not had a 
17 meeting where at least the central folks from 
18 safety aren't there. 
19 Q. How many people does that include from safety? 
20 A. At least one. 
21 Q. That's a safety engineer? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Then, what's his name? 
24 A. It varies from meeting to meeting. It may 
25 vary. 
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Q. What after the PS & E review? 
A. After the PS & E review we have what's called a 
3 I final review in which there's only two sets of 
4 plans distributed at that time. One goes to 
5 the division of safety. One goes to project 
6 engineer. 
7 Q. What does the final review consist of? 
8 A. Just them assuring that the project engineer, 
9 who has to build the project, has everything he 
10 wants in the plan and division of safety given 
11 their concurrence for the traffic control plans 
12 particularly and the deciding which elevation 
13 for the project. 
14 Q. The final review, who attends that meeting? 
15 A. It's not an attended meeting. It's the only 
16 one that's not attended. It's a distribution 
17 and you have X days to give comment. 
18 Q. Who can give comment? 
19 A. The project engineer, and division of safety. 
20 Q. Were there comments in this project? 
21 A. From those two at that time? I don't think so. 
22 Q. Then, what happens after the final review and 
23 distribution of those two sets of plans? 
24 A. After any comment or no response, then 
25 advertising. 
Q. So, you had barrels plus two feet? 
A. Plus two feet, yes. 
Q. What you were describing in your answer was a 
comfort level that drivers have when they were 
going up against a concrete barrier immediately 
next to them? 
A. Well, yeah. Of course, it works the same with 
both features. You still have that tendency to 
shy, whether it's barrier or barrels. 
Q. I think you previously testified, did you not, 
with regards to why you felt 100-foot was 
adequate as opposed to anything less --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- given the fact that the driver is going 50 
to 70 miles per hour, which would be 75 to 105 
feet per second. 
A. In this case we set up 50 or 55 mile per hour 
even as advisory speeds. The hundred foot 
spacing was accurate. 
Q. Had the contractor suggested in this particular 
project that the two-way traffic be separated 
with concrete barriers as opposed to barrels or 
drums, would UDOT have changed to concrete 
barriers throughout the project? 
A. No. 
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Smaller than barrels? 
Smaller than barrels. 
Mr. Ferguson had you identify the benefits of 
concrete barriers, and you also talked about one 
of the risks as -- I believe is being rear end, 
multiple rear-end accidents; is that correct? 
Correct. 
If you have concrete barriers such as have been 
suggested by Mr. Ferguson, if you had those on the 
1-84 project, would that cut down the availability 
of escape on any side in order to avoid a rear-end 
accident for eastbound traffic if there would have 
been channeled concrete barriers on both sides? 
You cut down -- possibly cut down the access to 
the -- for people trying to maneuver out in front, 
moving across into the other lane. 
So, you cut down any escape routes whatsoever to 
either side? 
Eastbound? 
By eastbound? 
Yes. 
That creates a risk in and of itself, correct? 
That creates a risk, too, yes. 
Do you remember discussing that with UDOT at any 
time, in weighing the pros and cons of the 
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ends somebody going 60 miles an hour, is that also 
an accident where you're going to have serious 
injury? 
A. Possible, yes. 
Q. Do you know whether it is more safe to use 
concrete barriers or barrels in the situation you 
had at 1-84? 
A. (No response.) 
Q. Do you know one way or the other? 
A. No. I mean, it's a hard one to answer. 
Q. There are pros and cons? 
A. Pros and cons on both. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. Durrant as to 
those pros and cons? 
A. Again, we probably did. I'm not recalling my 
conversation. 
Q. How was it left in terms of what you as the 
representative of Three Bees was supposed to do 
with regards to the existing circumstances of 
barrels? 
A. It was decided basically to do the concrete with 
respect to --
(Discussion off the record.) 
Q. (By Mr. Morgan): What was decided as a result of 
the conversation you had with Mr. Durrant? 
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Subject: Traffic Control - Lane Separation 
Dear Mr. Durrant: 
Tnis letter is to reiterate our concerns with regard to UDOT's less than adequate traffic control 
design for this project. In particular we feel that the use of drams at 100' spacing to delineate 
opposing traffic in an Interstate highway is hazardous to the travelling public resulting in 
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field office at the number indicated below. 
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BALL, BALL AND BROSAMER, INC. 
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Shankar !wayanan 
Project Manager 
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PLE.1SE REPLY TO- P 0. Box 888. Stolen. Utah 8^050 
/QHf\ V)n mr\r\ r- /ort\ o^n DEPOSITION 
Tab 5 
Michael 0 . Leavic: 
W. Craig Zwick 
Dyke M. L^revre. P.£. 
UTAH DEI -ARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
REGION ONE 
169 Nortn Wall Avenue 
PO. 3ox 12530 
Cgcen. Utan 3<ui2-2530 
(301) 399-5921 
Fax: (301) 299-5925 
'ill 
May 3 0 , 1995 S 
U1 
Transportation Commiuion 
Cicn E. 3rown 
cs..,„.„ 
Todd G. Wes:3 n 
v«. c.\,.,,*,„ 
James C. Larktrt 
Ted D. Lewis 
Hal M. Clyde 
Shirley J. [verjon 
Mr. Shankar Narayanan, Project Manager 
Ball, Ball & Brosamer Inc. 
P.O. Box 888 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
Re: Project No. *IM-84-6(70)102 
1-84,^Morgan to Summit County 
Traffic Control - Lane Separation 
Dear Sir: 
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Sincerely 
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A. It would be nothing but a guess. 
Q. What's your guess? 
MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I won't allow you to 
speculate, but if you have an educated guess, go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Four times. 
Q. (By Mr. Ferguson) And why do you say four 
times? 
A. One half the road at one time, so that meant 
that traffic had to be shifted to the other side, and that's 
once. You're shifting it back is twice both directions, is 
four. 
Q. Did you ever talk to a manufacturer's 
representative about the Rolex system and it's being used in 
1-84 in that canyon? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you talk with anybody who had used it 
before to determine whether or not it would work on 1-84? 
A. No. 
Q. Did anybody ever ask your opinion before this 
accident whether or not that Rolex system would work in the 
canyon on 1-84? 
A. No. I never had any conversation with anybody 
about it, period. 
Q. What, if anything, would have caused UDOT to 
switch from barrels to barriers on 1-84? 
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SUSAN HELLBERG-YOUNG, CSR, RPR 
1 I MR. MINNOCK: I would object, speculation. 
2 J MR. WILLIAMS: I'll join in that, it's vague 
3 I and overbroad. If you feel like you can answer, go ahead. 
4 J THE WITNESS: I don't believe it is obviously a 
5 I concern, the safety of the highway condition, the user 
6 I interpretation. I don't believe anything short of horrendous 
7 I statistics would have got another look at that. 
8 1 Q. (By Mr. Ferguson) Is it fair to say that the 
9 I accidents that occurred in the two-way, two-lane operation 
10 J with the traveling public during the time that construction 
11 J went on were within the acceptable risks of injury by UDOT? 
12 J MR. WILLIAMS: Object to the use of the phrase 
13 J acceptable risks of injury. Vague and ambiguous. 
14 I THE WITNESS: Are you waiting for an answer? 
15 I Q. (By Mr. Ferguson) Yes. 
16 I A. I can't answer. It's wholly speculative to me, 
17 and I don't have a feel for it. 
1 8
 I Q. Did you have the authority on your own to 
19 require that the barrels be switched to barriers once the 
20 construction had started? 
21 A. No. 
2 2
 I Q. Did you have authority on your own during the 
23 I design phase to require that barrels be used rather than 
24 I barriers? 
A. No. 
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A. 
Q. 
construction 
A. 
have been up 
totally 
Yes, we was. 1 
Had you been up and down that road since the 
i started before this? 1 
Yes, I have. I can't say how many times. I 
and down it so many times since, it's just J 
confusing as to when they started it. I don't have 
any idea, but our normal would be at least twice a month, we 
would be in 
on? 
at the 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
time 
A. 
Q. 
Ogden. 
Now, where were you seated in the vehicle? 1 
Where was I? 1 
Seated. 
I was the driver. 
Where was your wife seated? 
She was the passenger. 
In the passenger seat? 
Yes, she was. 
Do you recall if you both had your seat belts 
Yes, we did. 
Was anyone else in the vehicle? 
No, there wasn't. 
Can you tell me about how fast you were going 
of the accident? 
45 to 50 miles an hour. 
-Do you -know whether there was anybody behind 
43 1 
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ESTIMATED TRAVEL SPEED 
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INCICATE . 'NTcPScCT'CN TVs 
Vehicle #i vas traveling; vest on 1-84 just vest of milepost 108. The driver lost 
control and ran into the right hand euardrail. The vehicle then traveled off the right 
hand shoulder, back onto the roadvav and into the eastoound lane of travel, vhere it 
ran head-on into vehicle #2. 
If Hazardous Materials were
 tnvcrve<2 
list the piacarc numcer from erf :ne 
comme:aai verncle: 
E *0 ."CPSSTY 
T H A N VEHICLES. None 
x^c ttnxx 
53ES 
Craig Higlev 
Vickv Weave: 
Name ooj«c: ana state nature a r d amount oi damage 
Adcress 267 So. S t a t e , C l e a r f i e l d , Utah
 Pncnt 546-6166 
!A«rtss 74 N. Lakeview Dr . , C l e a r f i e l d , Uta^n, 393-8305_ 
=1PST AJO ACwiNtSTEPEO 3Y 
em an 5 • Pnrvait individual 
i*n 7 • Mosottal 
anat Pxvxv** 3 • Heteowe* Personnel 
**3»cs 9 • Ncrw AdmjTfjjered 
r 0 • \J(\incr*n 
tw5 M*C*T .*? 
95125 A 
fwq » f c * T o 
INJUfiEQ TAXEN 3Y 
1- Arr.cuiance. Private 
2- AmcV-ance. Fire 
3- Pararr.edics 
4- Private Vehicle 
5- Helicopter 
6-Other 
TIME: Amo. Ciiied: 1805 1817 
IKJUfiSO TAXEN TO 
Ogden Regional Cente: 
9 - 2 ^ - 9 5 
"KT 
Oate Nooiied ol Acodent 
130^ 
182? 
Time Noshed ol Acoo*«t 
Af/rved it Sce^e 
Source of Information 
Officer at scene ^ 
Onver No. 
Oher 
.Ccr.sacec sraticn 
!nv*t:i$ation 3/ »cc:Cent 
1200 ff.e 1 N e x c . ^ .'04*Owrt^<J 
PHOTC(S) TAKES 
Y E 3 H SJOC 
VIDEO TAKEN 
Y S S C N C I 
FIELD DIAGnAM 
Y E S * N C I 
None . CMa/ge: 
. C\arg«: 
>n '.men NOUS 
it Yes. Report Numcer 
j r q a <?r" ^ • f ^ A / v ^ m 7/B U . H . P . | 9-25-95 
OFFICER'S RANK ANO NAME! 
n For No Diagram . 
wa *( sc«n« 
i moved 
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INCtCA7= INTERSECTION *vpc 
If Hazardous Materials -ve^e involves 
Hs( the Qiacarc numcer from eft [fie 
cemmercal vernce: 
3H TO PPCPSflTY 
* THAN VEHICS5. 
and acdreu of 
of oo.-ec: struc* 
lESSSS 
Name oojec: anc sute mature ir.a amount of aamage 
. Acaress . 
. Afloress . 
. P i o n e . 
.
3 h o n e . 
] " IfiST AiO ACMINISTSP.SO 3Y 
*3»<eman 5 • Pnvaie individual 
Mfeman 7 • Hcscttai 
imoutance Personnel 8 • Hexccter Personnel 
'arameocs 9 • .None Acrmnistereo 
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:NJUPED TAKEN 3Y 
t- Amoutence. Private 
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•i - Pnvaie v e n c e 
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5- Ctner 
ni T?M6: Amo Caiieo 
INJURED TAKEN TO 
: A C . I V I I Y 
{USE 
•MlLlTAPy 
riKtg, 
Mc*Mf» Oay 
1 Csie Notthec 
Yea/ 
j T.rie Nc<if«e<3 of Ac::cen( 
! Atn*#3 u Scene 
Source of Information 
Cflicer at sce^e 
Onve'' No 
O e r 
Ccr.tcctec s:a:-cn 
invesngancn of acc-ee"' 
Ccnvnel it n n 
?H0T0(S)TAX: 
Y E 5 Z N C I 
VIDEO TX<z>i 
YES I NC I 
FIELD OIAGFA 
YES I NC .. 
bA in^c-»C::On Yes No 
*>er a-.'p" ra-en 
If Y*s Peoort Numoer 
. CMarge 
. C w c e 
iTroooer Mike Loveland #500 7/3 U.H.P. 1 10-24-95 
i 
r a c s v i c f j p s APPP.CVAU D A T E OF F l E ? C 
>cd fype_ (^'/-fs //_-bw^ 
Tes: skids 
Condition 
Drag 
factor 
Invesf igefer ^_A^/ i 
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_£££ 
^ f / W 
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T " . u ^ _ v 7 y 7 ^ . C O L O R Z , 
~~
 L I C
 COLOR 
#4 MAKE 
LOCATION S DIRECTION 
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Tab 9 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALAN TRUJILLO and SHARON ) 
TRUJILLO, ) 
Plaintiffs, j 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION; BALL, ) 
BALL & BROSAMER, INC., a ) 
California corporation; ) 
and JOHN DOES I through X, ) 
Defendants. j 
CIVIL NO. 960907179PI 
DEPOSITION OF: 
MICHAEL LOVELAND 
Held March 3, 1997 
REPORTED BY: 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
^ <T\ \C)j%>7 
^ ^ U u 
Deposition of MICHAEL LOVELAND, taken on behalf 
of the Defendants, at the Layton City Courthouse, 425 
North Wasatch Drive, Layton, Utah, commencing at 1:30 
p.m. on March 3, 1997, before RENEE L. STACY, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, pursuant to Notice. 
* * * * 
REPORTING SERVICES, LLC 
' 7 0 SOU""'-' V A ' \ S ' ^ E E ^ 
5 - - " " LAKE C'~ U~->~ 3 2 ' C ' 
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A It was a 100-foot cord. Middle cord in of 
j 3.8, which translates into 58 miles per hour. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
plug that 
A 
me. 
Q 
in, it yi 
A 
Q 
of 50 mil 
Was that 
What's that DF? 
The drag factor of the vehicle. 
Which — is that .65? 
6.5. 
What's the formula for that? How do you 
in? Is there a chart or do you have to — 
There is a chart. I don't have it with 
Okay. But if you plug those three numbers 
elds 58 miles an hour? 
Yes. 
You indicated a posted speed in that area 
es an hour. What type of posting was that? 
the normal speed or the advisory speed 
established by a construction site? 
A 
Q 
A 
zone. 
Q 
Trujillos 
Yes. 
Was that — so that was the advisory speed? 
Posted. Both sides of the construction 
You indicated a travel speed for the 
of 50 miles an hour. How was that 
determined? 
A That was just from talking to the 
^ RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 28 
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To: 
From: 
/ Id. 
Of. 
Phone: FJ= J 62SJ 
Phoned 
Recurned Your Call 
Please Call 
Will Call Again 
Came To See You 
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